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Among the recent publications on constituent power, Lucia Rubinelli’s new book
stands out. In a rapidly growing field characterised by conceptual innovations
that apply the idea of constituent power to ever more areas of politics and law,
Constituent Power: A History positions itself with an analytically impressive
reconstruction of the uses of the term in the history of political thought. In a way,
Rubinelli takes a meta-perspective on debates about constituent power. Instead of
simply presenting a history of the concept, her goal is to show how other histories
– or, more precisely, theories of constituent power based on such genealogies –
are selective in nature and obscure many of the iterations of meaning constituent
power has seen since its first invocations. Rubinelli takes issue with the work of
contemporary theorists, who, according to her, streamline the history of constituent
power in order to defend their own preferred view as a logical continuation of the
family tree.
In these brief remarks, I reflect on Rubinelli’s interpretation and critique of what is
going on in contemporary theoretical debates about constituent power. What I want
to argue is that while her reconstruction of classical positions is highly illuminating
and takes our understanding of constituent power’s complex history to a new level,
we risk underestimating the ideas in play if we regard them, as Rubinelli suggests
we should, as “contingent” (p. 29) and therefore equally valid. Theoretical debates
about constituent power are not just attempts to fix a preferred meaning, possibly
with reference to a skewed genealogy, but reflect the systematic search for the
most plausible conceptualization and the superior normative elaboration of the
idea. In this context, a selective recourse to the history of political thought can be
methodologically justified as a way to carve out the key features of a particular model
of constituent power – which then needs to be argued for on independent grounds.
In Search of the “Correct Meaning” of Constituent
Power
Rubinelli looks at contemporary conceptualizations of constituent power, including
the normative theories that build on them, through the eyes of a historian of political
thought. More precisely, she interprets them as being grounded in particular
genealogies – in her words, they are attempts “to prove the correct meaning of
constituent power” with reference to its use over time (p. 14). I fully support the aim
of doing justice to the various historical uses of the concept, but I wonder whether
this is the most charitable reading of today’s theoretical debates about constituent
power and the one that allows us best to make sense of them. Rubinelli is critical
of the fact that contemporary theorists “are not willing to concede that each [of their
views] can be equally valid” (p. 14).
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In current debates, we find competing normative theories in which the concept
of constituent power – or a particular conception of it – plays a key role. Rubinelli
seems to suggest that any attempt to prove any of these positions as superior is
futile because they are all grounded in selective genealogies. The implication seems
to be that because the concept of constituent power has been used in various ways
throughout its history, normative theories based on it reveal little more than the
author’s personal taste or political standpoint.
This strikes me as a form of relativism, which I would like to resist and which I think
does not necessarily follow from Rubinelli’s findings about constituent power’s
historical iterations of meaning. There is a difference between the methodologies of
history of political thought on the one hand and normative political theory (as well as
constitutional theory) on the other. It is true of all core concepts of political theory –
freedom, justice, democracy, etc. – that they are contested and that they have been
used in different ways historically. Yet, we assume that progress in the normative
theorizing of these ideas is possible, even if the most plausible account may in part
depend on the social and political context to which it is meant to be applied.
What I want to suggest is that when contemporary theorists of constituent power
appeal to the concept’s history, and do so selectively, this is usually not in order
to ground their normative claims (to fabricate evidence for them, one might say
polemically), but to carve out a particular model for which they then provide
(or at least should provide) independent arguments. The recourse to particular
classics, but not others, serves to develop a clear position which can then enter
into competition with others. If we were not concerned with the search for the most
plausible understanding of constituent power, and if there were nothing at stake,
what would be the point of our theoretical debates?
On the Separation of Constituent and Constituted
Powers
I would like to illustrate my point by taking a stance on the model of constituent
power advanced in post-World War II Europe by Mortati, Vedel, and Böckenförde
– as Rubinelli reconstructs it in Chapter 4. According to Rubinelli, in the work of
these authors, constituent power describes not only the democratic source of
the constitution, but “becomes a tool to promote popular participation inside the
constitutional state” (p. 151; emphasis added). In the case of Mortati and Vedel,
this not only means that constituent power includes capacities of constitutional
change, but that is has a role to play in ordinary politics – that there is the need for
strong popular participation in day-to-day decision-making. Mortati calls for forms
of direct democracy, such as a right for citizens to initiate law-making processes,
and suggests that political parties may be a vehicle for constituent power – a notion
which, by the way, has recently been revived in debates about constituent power
in the European Union. Vedel primarily argues for a decentralization of the state,
assuming that shifting the locus of politics from the national to the local level would
open up possibilities for popular participation – again, through instruments of direct
democracy.
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In order to defend the view that constituent power implies the need for strong popular
participation in ordinary politics, these authors have to downplay the importance
of the distinction between constituent and constituted power. As Rubinelli explains
with regard to Vedel, “the rigidity of this distinction” is seen as “an attempt to keep
constituent power at bay and prevent its participation in actual politics” (p. 174). Let
me provide a critique of this view in order to show that there is indeed a lot at stake
in theoretical debates about constituent power and that we should operate on the
assumption that some models can prove superior to others in the sense that better
arguments can be made in their support.
As Rubinelli explains in Chapter 1, Sieyès’s distinction between pouvoir constituant
and pouvoir constitué implies a vertical separation of powers. As Sieyès puts it: “No
type of delegated power can modify the conditions of its delegation. […] Thus, all
the parts of a government are answerable to and, in the last analysis, dependent
upon the nation”. To explain why this idea is of crucial importance we can turn to
another thinker from post-World War II Europe – namely, the Frankfurt political
theorist Ingeborg Maus. As Maus argues, the “incredible rationality” (unerhörte
Rationalität) of the idea of a hierarchical ordering between the citizens as constituent
power and the public authorities as constituted powers consists in preventing political
institutions from engaging in self-referential competence distribution. The distinction
makes clear that public authorities must not be involved in decisions about their own
conditions of operation. Political institutions command only those powers that the
citizens confer on them and only as long as they do not withdraw them again. By
contrast, if we blur the line between constituent and constituted powers, as Mortati
and Vedel do, it may allow us to call for a stronger role of citizens in ordinary politics,
but it also means that we undermine the idea of a vertical separation of powers
and thus open the door for claims of constituted powers to act in the name of the
constituent power in the shaping of the political system. What arises is the danger of
a self-empowerment of actors with institutional self-interests.
The continuing importance of a clear separation of constituent and constituted
powers is evident in current debates about constituent power in supranational
contexts such as the European Union. As Rubinelli notes in the conclusion of her
book, much of the recent literature revolves around the implications of globalization
and pursues the idea of constituent power beyond the state. In a way, Vedel
anticipated these debates. As Rubinelli explains, he was critical of European
integration as well as certain international treaties such as human rights conventions
to the extent that they claim supra-constitutional status, and in this way restrict the
people’s constituent power (p. 168). Ironically, however, Vedel’s willingness to blur
the line between constituent and constituted power apparently prevented him from
identifying the deeper problem. Ultimately, the issue is not an external restriction on
the freedom of citizens, but an internal lack of a vertical separation of powers. As
the case of the EU demonstrates, the reason why regional and global integration
carry the risk of an increasing loss of citizen control over the organization of public
authority is that governments are allowed to act as de facto constituent powers at the
supra-state level.
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Drawing Selectively on the History of Constituent
Power
So, not all ideas of constituent power are equally valid – at least not in the sense
that we are unable to determine which are more plausible from a normative point
of view. For the reasons just mentioned, it seems clear to me that models of
constituent power that insist on a vertical separation of powers are superior to
models that blur the line between pouvoir constituant and pouvoir constitué. As
Rubinelli notes, despite all the similarities between Böckenförde’s views and those
of Mortati and Vedel, the former insisted on a clear distinction between constituent
and constituted power exactly in order “to prevent improper uses of popular authority
by the legislative power and the constituted order” (p. 172). My overall point here
is that, because of such differences, it can be methodologically appropriate for
contemporary theorists to narrow their historical focus. Rubinelli’s book brilliantly
traces the complex family tree of constituent power, making a major contribution
to the history of political thought. However, for democratic theorists engaging in
normative debates about constituent power, it can be useful to engage only with a
particular branch in order to carve out the key features of a specific model. Such an
approach is unproblematic as long as one does not confuse one’s genealogy with an
argument supporting the proposed model of constituent power.
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